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A case of considerable interest
ALIENATION BY THE COURTS.
and of far-reaching importance has been recently decided by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. I refer to -Freeman'sAppeal, 181
Pa. 405 (Mar. 27, 1897). It was an appeal from the Orphans'
Court of Philadelphia County, resulting in an affirmance of the
decree, the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Williams dissenting.
The case was this: Henry G. Freeman, by his last will, devised to
the Girard Trust and Life Insurance, Etc., Company certain real estate
at the southeast cbrner of Broad and Chestnut streets, Philadelphia,
in trust, to make sales of all or any part of his real estate, at its discretion, for the benefit of his estate, either at public or private
sale, etc. ; provided always, nevertheless, that no such sale of any
part of his real estate shall be made without the consent in writing
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of the several cesftis que trastent having any interest therein, and
who may, at the time being, be of lawful age and accessible, and
with further power to make loans, from time to time, of the real
estate, and to collect, demand and receive the rents, incomes and
proceeds thereof, etc.
On petition of one of the cestuis que trustent the Orphans' Court
granted leave to the trustee to execute an "improvement lease,"
for fifty years, of the property, against the express objection of
cestuis quc Irttstent owning a one-sixth interest therein.
Then cestuis que trtstent appealed. The contention of the appellees was, that the Orphans' Court had jurisdiction to make
the decree under Section 2 of the Act of April i8, 1853, familiarly
known as the "Price Act."
The words of that section are:
"Such sale, mortgaging, leasing or conveyance upon ground rent
may be decreed whenever such real 'estate may be held for or
owned by . . . trustees for any public or private use or trust,
and although there may exist a power of sale, but the time may
not have arrived for its exercise, or any preliminary act may not
have been done to bring it into exercise, or the time limited for its
exercise may have expired, or any one or more persons requiredto
consent or to join in its execution may have become non compos
mentis, or have removed out of the State, or died, or should refuse
to act, or unreasonablywithhold consent," etc. In the first section
of the act it is provided that such sale, etc., may be decreed only
when the court is of opinion that it will be for the interest of
the parties concerned, "and may be done without injury or prejudice to any trust, charity or purpose for which the same shall be
held."
The act, therefore, would seem to give the court power to grant
just such a decree as was asked for in this case. For the fact that
the decree would dispense with the actual consent required by the
terms of the will creating the trust, cannot be considered ipsofacto
an "injury or prejudice" to the trust within the meaning of the
first section of the act-for ex necessitate every such decree would
have this effect. The court below, in Freeman's Appeal, having
been convinced that the withholding of consent was unreasonable, were right in making the decree, therefore, useless: first,
the "improvement lease" not being really a sale, was not within
the power of the trustees under any circumstances; and, second, the
authority given the court was beyond the constitutional power of
the legislature. It seems to me that an "improvement lease" is
very far from being equivalent to, or even analogous to, or part of,
a sale. And as it was not pretended that the power to "lease" in
the will included such a "lease" as this, there was no right on the
part of the court to decree a disposition of the property in any
way not contemplated by the testator. It can hardly be supposed
that it was the purpose of the act to enlarge the powers of testamentary trustees beyond that given them in the will-it is rather
to enable the express purposes of the trust to be carried out iti
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cases where some unforeseen circumstances or neglect of duty by
the trustees, etc., would otherwise prevent their accomplishment.
To say that the power to sell authorizes the trustees to lease property for fifty years, on condition that the lessee will erect a building on the ground in place of those already there, is certainly
quite a liberal construction of the words " to sell."
And if a trustee's powers are limited by the terms of the trust, such a construction is quite impossible. Bring this out into bold relief: The will
says the trustee shall have full power to sell with the written consent of all cestuis que truslent. The decree says the trustee shall
execute an improvement lease against the express objections of the
said cestuis que trustent.
This is so plainly subversive of the trust, that it ought not, it is
submitted, to be attempted by any court. But suppose an ordinary sale had been the subject of the petition, and the cestuis que
tristent had, as in the actual case, refused their consent, let us
ask, in the first place, does the act intend to confer power on the
court to act in such a case if it shall consider the refusal unreasonable? and, if so, is the grant of power constitutional? As to the
first question, a careful reading of the act will convince one that
the legislature did intend to do just that thing. And so the final
and important question is, is such a grant of power to the courts
valid? Mr. Chief Justice Sterrett has pointed out in his dissenting
opinion (p. 414) the line beyond which, I believe, the legislature cannot go. He says as to the power of the courts to "coerce" people
to consent: "If/they owe a duly, this may be conceded."
But as to
the disposal of their legal or equitable estates, persons suijiirishave a
right to exercise their good pleasure in disposing of them, without
being accountable to anyone for the reasons which actuate them.
l4'luntas stat Pro ratione, as the Chief Justice reminds us. The
legislature could not grant to the courts power to compel A to assent to the sale of property of which he is tenant in common with
B, no matter how clearly such sale would appear to be for the advantage of both ; and it is inconceivable that a different rule can
apply to an equitable estate when A.'s consent is expressly made a
condition precedent to any disposition of the property. Err'ine's
Appeal, 16 Pa. 256, and the other cases cited by the learned Chief
Justice at p. 413, abundantly sustain this position. Of course, in
many cases-doubtless in the present case-the doctrine I contend
for may produce great inconvenience, loss and injury. Persons
suijuris, and, legally speaking, of sound mind, will sometimes obstinately adhere to a position, in defiance of all common sense and
reason, to the great annoyance and disadvantage of others, whose
rights are bound. up with theirs. But the evils of the contrary
doctrine are even greater. The substitution of the judgment of a court
for that of an individual is a dangerous inroad upon individual liberty and control of property. Such a power might easily be abused
and a species of "paternalism" introduced, which it is not agreeable to contemplate even at a distance.
Lucius S. Landreth.
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ExEcur oR's ELEC'ION UNDER A WILL. Does the simple qualification of a son as executor under his father's will amount to an
election on the part of the son to take under the will?
This important question was raised in North Carolina for the first
time in the case of Allen v. Allen, 28 S. E. 513 (Sup. Ct. N. Car.,
Dec. 4, 1897). There a father, dying in 1874, devised to his
son a certain lot of ground, and made the son his executor. Two
years before his death, however, the father had given his son a deed
in fee simple for the same lot of grotid. The son qualified as
executor, and the first question was whether by that act he had
elected to take the property under the will instead of under the
deed.
At Common Law there was no doubt. By the act of qualification, the executor became vested with the whole personal estate)
and, after the payment of debts and legacies, was entitled to the
surplus, unless it appeared on the face of the will that the testator
did not so intend. It is manifest, then, that the executor, after
qualification, was bound to execute the provisions of the will; but
the reason for the Common Law rule is of no force at the present
day, because executors, after the debts and legacies are paid, are
trustees of the residuum for the next of kin. Yet the same conclusion is arrived at by adopting the view expressed in Afenleythall V.
Afeendlenhal, 8 Jones (N. C.), 287 (186o), that a widow who
qualified as executrix of her deceased husband, and took upon herself the execution of the will, waived her right to dissent. The
Chief Justice (Pearson) said: "Upon qualifying, she assumes the
duties and undertakes on oath to carry into effect the several provisions of the will, and it is inconsistent afterwards to do an act
which defeats, or in a great degree deranges, the provisions of the
will, and disappoints the intention of the testator therein expressed."
This seems to be a very reasonable rule, and there are no cases
to the contrary as far as we have been able to discover. So it was
held by analogy that the son held the land under the will.
Two further questions arose. The son had mortgaged the land,
and it was held, without doubt, that the mortgagee had a first lien
without reference to the manner in which his mortgagor had
acquired title. The father had stipulated that if his son took the
land he should pay the estate $2000. This was resolved to be a
charge, and not a condition precedent, so that the son had a vested
estate.
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES.
In the case of Alison v. Dun ,avod, 28
S. E. 651 (Dec. 17, 1896), published Jan. 17, 1898, the Supreme
Court of Georgia decided a rather interesting case, involving the
question of liquidated damages. The plaintiff in the case was not,
as is usual, seeking to be relieved from the damages as a penalty.
but was, in fact, seeking to recover additional damages over and
above those agreed upon in the contract as liquidated damages.
The defendant in the case bought some real estate from assignor of
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the plaintiff for $1440 under an agreement by which he was to pay
$480 cash and balance in one year, upon default, vendor to have
right to re-enter and take possession of the property, and sums paid
by defendant to be retained by the vendor as liquidated damages.
Defendant having paid S250 additional, became in default, and
suit was brought to recover $786.8o being balance of principal and
interest due. Defendant demurred on ground that plaintiff had
failed to allege that defendant was in possession of property and,
also, that contract permitted no right of recovery for any amount
against defendant, for it provided for right of re-entry in case of
failure of defendant to pay the balance due.
These demurrers were sustained and upon appeal were affirmed
by the Supreme Court. The court held that since the parties had
made a definite contract covering the points involved and as they
were equally competent to provide for the amount of damages to
be paid in case of failure to perform, as to determine any other
matter contained in the contract, and since the damages seemed
reasonable and fair, the parties must abide by their own agreement.
Under the facts in this case the decision would seem to be a fair
one, since the defendant, who was the party who might have asked
relief, seemed to be satisfied to abide by the contract. But, had
the parties been reversed, the reasoning of the court would not
necessarily be conclusive.
It has been generally held in such cases, that when the retention
of amounts paid under such a contract are in excess of the real
damage sustained and the latter is readily ascertainable, such
retention will be considered a penalty or forfeiture irrespective of
the mere language used in the contract.
In this case the real damages sustained might have been certain
and ascertainable, in which case, had the defendant proved that
they were for less than the sum paid by him on account of the purchase, he might have well asked for relief, in spite of the fact that
he had definitely contracted that plaintiff was to retain such sums,
and was competent to so contract. If it could have been shown
that plaintiff, as a matter of fact, had resold the premises to another
purchaser at an increased price, he could not have well claimed
more than nominal damages, and retention of defendant's purchase
money in such a case would have been cleirly a penalty. But in
this case the decision was clearly just, since the plaintiff had
received all the damages that the contract gave him a right to
exact and his claim to further damages was seemingly without
warrant: Kemldb/c v. Farren, 6 Bing. 141 ; Re .2ewinan, L. R. 4
Ch. Div. 724 ; S/reve v. Breveon, 51 Pa. 175 ; Ssear v. Smith,
i Denio, 464; Willis v. Cajpenter-, 13 Allen, 9.: Limon v.
Bqk1;cock, 40 Wis. 503 ; Ca.ster v. Strom, 41 Minn. 522 ; Tar,'e
v. Sand/ford. 7 Wheat. 13.
RFs ISA LoQuIrUR.
In certain classes of cases, where there is
no direct evidence of any particular act of negligence beyond the
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mere fact that something unusual has hal-pened which has caused
the injury, the courts have said that the doctrine of res i]5sa loqui/ur
may be properly applied. The literal translation of this phrase
defines, to the full extent, the meaning of the principle, viz., "the
thing speaks for itself."
The maxim, or phrase, is merely a short
way of saying that, so far as the court can see, the jury, from their
experience as men of the world, may be warranted in thinking
that an accident of this particular kind commonly does not happen
except in consequence of negligence;- andt tha;. therefore; there is
a presumption of fact, in the absence of further explanation or
other evidence, that the injury happened in consequence of negligence. In other words, the circumstances attendant upon the accident are themselves of such a character as to justify a jury in inferring negligence.
Thomas, in his recent book on Negligence, p. 574, states the
rule as follows:
"The principle is basic that the mere happening of an accident
through the existence of a defect does not, per se, impute negligence, that is, raise a presumption of negligence, but evidence
must be given tending to show that the defect existed by reason of
some culpable act or omission of the person charged.
"This rule is of very general application, and the exceptions to it
are limited and may be classified under two heads:i. When the relation of carrier and passenger exists and the
accident arises from some abnormal condition in the department
of actual transportation.
2. Where the injury arises from some condition or event that
is in its very nature so obviously destructive of the safety of person
or property, and is so tortious in its quality as, in the first instance,
at least, to permit no inference save that of negligence on the part
of the person in the control of the injurious agency."
The doctrine is one which is firmly settled ; the question is concerning its application. It has been well said that no presumption
of negligence ever arises from the mere unexplained happening
of an accident, but only from the attendant circumstances. The
real question, then, is as regards the attendant circumstances, and
each case must stand wholly on its own facts. Very little can be
generalized, but it may, perhaps, be safely stated that where a certain course of action has been pursued by any person without injury to others, and he, upon changing that course, injures another,
the thing (unexplained) speaks for itself that such person has been
negligent.
Chief Baron Pollock said in Byrne v. Boadle, 2 Hurlstone and
Coltman's Exch. 722 (1863), at p. 728: "A barrel could not roll
out of a warehouse without some negligence, and to say that a
plaintiff who is injured by it must call witnesses from the warehouse
to prove negligence seems to me preposterous."
In .Ecelsior
Electric Co. v. Sweet, 57 N. J. Law, 224 (1894), it was held that
the fall of an arc lamp suspended over a public street, without any
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explanatory evidence, raises a presumption of negligence, res isa
loquitur, sufficient to put the defendant on the defense. In Consolidated Trac/ion Co. v. 2Talheimer, Court of Errors and Appeals
of New Jersey, March, 1897, 2 Amer. Neg. Rep. 196, it appeared
that the plaintiff was a passenger of the appellant, and, having been
notified by the conductor that the car was approaching the point
where she desired to alight, got up from her seat and walked to the
door while the car was in motion, and, while coming through the
doorway, she was thrown into the street by a sudden lurch and
injured. The court said: "At all events, the fact that such a lurch
or jerk occurred, as would have been unlikely to occur if proper
care had been exercised, brings the case within the maxim ' res
ipsa loquitr.' " In Howserv. Cumberland& " Pa. R. R. Co., 8o
Md. 146 (1894-5), the plaintiff was injured while walking on a
footpath along the defendant's roadbed, but not upon its right of
way, by half a dozen crossties which fell upon him from a gondola
car attached to a passing train. The court said: "If the presumption arising out of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur finds proper
application anywhere, we think this is a case in which it should be
applied."
Additional recent cases are - St. Louis Ry. Co. v. iVeely,
Supreme Court of Arkansas, April, 1897, 2 Amer. Neg. Rep. 492;
" The Afaiestic," 166 U. S. 375 (1897) ; Shafer v. Lacock, I68
Pa. 497 (I895).
In the case of Penna. R. R. Co. v. Mac.Einney, 124 Pa.
462, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, quoting with approval
the language of the New York Court of Appeals, said:
"It generally happens, however, in cases of this kind, that the
same evidence which proves the injury done, proves also the defendant's negligence, or shows circumstances from which strong
presumptions of negligence arise, and which cast on the defendant
the burden of disproving it. For example, a passenger's leg is
broken while on his passage in a railroad car. This mere fact is
no evidence of negligence on the part of the carrier until something further be shown. If the witness who swears to the injury
testifies also that it was caused by a crash in a collision with another
train of cars belonging to the same carrier, the presumption of
negligence immediately arises; not, however, from the fact that
the leg was broken, but from the circumstances attending the fact.
On the other hand, if the witness who proves the injury swears
that at the moment when it happened he heard the report of a gun
outside of the car and found a bullet in the fractured limb, the
presumption would be against the negligence of the carrier."
This question was very ably discussed in the paper books of the
case of Stearns v. Ontario Spinnb4ng Co., Sup. Ct. Pa., Jan. io,
1898, reported in Weekly Notes of Cases for Feb. 18, 1898. The
facts were that an axe-head, after being used for two minutes, flew
off, and, falling down an open shaftway, so injured an employe of
another company that he thereafter died. Judge Fell refused to
apply the doctrine of res i'sa louiltr, and sustained the nonsuit
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suffered in the court below. The court was unable to see that the
mere fact of an axe-head flying off, without proof of further negligence, was sufficient to take the case out of the category of unavoidable accidents. The burden thus thrown on the defendant
was not that of satisfactorily accounting for the accident, but
merely that of showing that he used due care.
CONTEMPI'
OF COURT; DEFENSE.
The ubiquitous contempt case
.has again made its appearance in an unusually artbitrasy form in riClaDeher v. Superior Comrt of Sacramento Cauntl', 51 Pac. 696 (Cal.,
Dec. 27, 1897). It carries with it the conviction that the framers
of the Constitution did not labor in vain when they declared that
freedom of speech and of the press should be inviolate. It also
shows the liberal interpretation put upon this clause of the Constitution by the Sacramento Bee, the editor of which journal undertook to show wherein his honor, Judge Catlin, had suffered a
"gross fabrication" to pass unchallenged. judge Catlin decided
that McClatchey (the editor) had been guilty of constructive con-*
tempt, and issued a citation directing him to show cause why he
should not be punished therefor. The contemptuous publication
alluded to is couched in terse, vigorous English, stamped with an
impress unmistakably Western, and reads as follows: " The Bee
will not keep in its employ a reporter who garbles or who misstates,
but when a newsgatherer does his duty and tells the truth, it will
not stand silently by while an aggregation of attorneys tries to make
him out a liar, and while a prejudiced and vindictive czar upon the
bench aids and abets them in such a purpose. The Bee re-asserts
that in all material details the statement of Tallmadge, as given in
the Bee of yesterday, was the statement that he made upon the
stand at Monday afternoon's session. The Bee will go further than
that. It will declare that both the attorneys before the bar and the
judge on the bench knew that the statement made in the Bee was
an essentially correct epitome of the testimony given by Mr. Tallmadge at the very moment when they unhesitatingly, shamelessly,
and brazenly declared it to be a gross fabrication. There is no
paper anywhere that has a higher regard for fair and impartial
courts than has the Bee, but there is no paper anywhere that has a
supremer contempt than has the Bee for a judge who will approve
the unmitigated falsehood of an attorney, as Judge Catlin to-day
approved the brazen misstatement of Judge J. B. Devine." Judge
Catlin came to the conclusion that the article contained aspersions
on his character derogatory to his judicial position in the community, and acted with a promptness and energy equally characteristic.
At the trial the learned judge refused to permit the defendant to
show the truth of the statements, but considerately offered to allow
him to prove want of malice, which, of course, the defendant
refused to take advantage of. The majority of the Supreme Court
did not adopt Judge Catlin's view of the case, however, but decided
that the refusal to allow the defense of truth deprived the accused
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of his constitutional right to he heard in his own defense, and of
his right to due process of law, and that the order finding the
accused guilty of contempt should be annulled.
The publication of truth as to legal proceedings is not contempt
of court: Iz re Shor/ridge, 99 Cal. 526 (1893).
A court possessing plenary powers to punish for contempt, has not the right to
summon a defendant to answer, and then refuse to allow the party
summoned to answer or strike his answer from the files on the ground
that he has been guilty of a contempt of court. Hovey v. Elliott,
167 U. S. 409 (1896) ; where the judical history concerning contempt of court in England and this country was reviewed in extenso.
For contempt cases, pro and con, see Afc Veigh v. U. S., ii Wall
259 (1870) ; Galpin v. Page, x8 Wall. 350 (1873) ; Ex pare
IdVal, 107 U. S. 265 (1882) ; Brinkley v. Brinkley, 47 N. Y. 40
(1871); IMalkerv. Walker, 82 N. Y. 260 (188o).

FALSE PRETENCE; OBTAINING CREDIT BY FRAUD.
The ballad
of the penniless Frenchman who entered a restaurant and, in
response to the waiter's query, answered "Vat you please," thereby
avoiding any express promise to pay, seemed, perhaps, too absurd
to warrant anyone's indulging in speculations as to the reslaurateur"s
legal rights. This was the question, however, which the court was
called upon to decide in the case of Regina v. i'lliam Jones, i Q.
B. 1I9 (Nov. 13, 1897). Lord Russell, who delivered the opinion,
stated the facts as follows: " The prosecutor kept an eating house,
and on June 2oth the defendant went in and asked for some soup ;
he was told that there was none ready, and thereupon asked for
some cold beef; he was told that there was none, but that he
could have some cold lamb and salad; and this he accordingly
ordered. He then ordered half a pint of sherry, and went upstairs
to have his meal ; while there he rang the bell, and ordered
another half pint of sherry. Subsequently he again rang the bell,
and asked what there was to pay ; and upon being told four shillings, said that he had no means of paying; that he had no money,
and had (as was the fact) only a halfpenny upon him."
It was
held that he could not be convicted of the offence of obtaining
goods by false pretences, but that he was liable to be convicted of
obtaining credit by means of fraud within the meaning of sec. 13,
sub-sec. i,of the Debtor's Act, 1869.
Cases are not wanting to the effect that there can be false pretence by conduct. Wearing a cap and gown to convey the false
notion that he was a member of the university was held to be false
pretence: Rex v. Barnard, 7 C. & P. 784 (1837). And a promise to do a thing inftiiro may involve the false pretence that the
promisor has the power to do that thing: Reg. v. Giles, L. & C.
502 (1865);
Re''.v. Jacksont, 3 Camp. 370 (1813); Re., v.
Crosslelr, 2 M. & R. 17 (1837) ; Reg. v. Hazleton, L. R. 2 C. C.
134 (1874) ; Reg. v.Ahuphy, 13 Cox 298 (1876).
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CORPORATIONS; EXCESS OF DEBT; VALIDITY.
Smith v. Per-ies
&- C. H. Riv. Co., 51 Pac. 710 (Cal.) (Dec. 28, 1897), decided

a question which, though not entirely new, is not settled, and is of
much importance to those dealing with corporations. The complainant, a stockholder in the defendant corporation, alleged that
the directors had issued bonds to an amount which violated the
provision of the Civil Code, § 309, that directors of corporations
must "not create debts beyond the subscribed capital stock."
The substance of the prayer was that said unlawful increase be
declared void and the earnings applied to other purposes. While
the court held, on somewhat unsatisfactory reasoning, that there was
no excess of debt, they further held that, even if such excess existed, the bonds representing it would not be void, and referred to
the previous case of UOnterhill v. Santa Barbara, Etc., Co., 93
Cal. 300 (1892).
The court in this case considered that, as a
subsequent section of the Code provided a remedy by the corporation or its creditors against directors violating § 309, the intent of
this latter section was not to invalidate such obligations, and en-.
forced the obligations then in question. Statutes more or less similar to that of California have been passed in District of Columbia,
Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland, Mississippi, Michigan,
New York, Rhode Island and Utah. While in some of these the
legislature has expressly enacted that a remedy shall exist against
the corporation, in others the statutes are silent ; but even in the
latter class there seems a decided tendency on the part of the
courts to hold the corporation liable to suit on all the obligations
issued: Thompson on Corporations, § 4267 ; TFolvertlon v. Taylor,
132 111. 210 (i89o), and to treat the liability of the directors as an
additional security: fJnwr v. Hnning-,
93 U. S. 231 (1876).
Such a construction of these statutes is, in view of the fact that it
is impossible for parties dealing with corporations to learn their
exact indebtedness, and also because it tends to prevent fraud on
the part of the corporations themselves, the only just construction
possible; and it, moreover, is well supported on principle. To sustain
this latter statement it is but necessary to recall the well settled
rule, that a corporation, unless restrained by its charter, may contract debts and issue obligations the same as an individual: Barry
v. 3fr,-chanls' 1?.vchan.ie, t Sandf. Ch. 2 80 (1844); Jones v. Guarantv Co., ior U. S. 622 (1879). This being so, a statute should
not be construed so as to take away this power unless the language
is clear to that effect. But the language generally used in the statutes is not prohibitive. The phrases most usually occurring are:
"If the indebtedness exceed" the capital stock, the directors shall
be liable," etc. ; or, " the directors shall not issue obligations in
excess of the capital," and similar expressions. To give such expressions as these a construction exempting a corporation from
direct liability on bonds, mortgages and other securities, which are
nowadays issued to such enormous extent, would be to reach a
result probably never intended by the framers of these statutes, as

